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Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, University of Torino, Torino, Italy
The concept of theory of mind (ToM) has considerably changed since its first proposal.
The aim of first human studies was to understand how young children acquire the
representation of others’ mental states, in particular beliefs, and how they distinguish
them from their own and from reality. The False Belief Task was designed to prove
the acquisition of this capacity. According to children’s performance in this test the
acquisition of ToM has been attested at around 4 years of age. In last years it has
been shown that using spontaneous response tasks also 15-month-old-children could
attribute to an agent a false belief about the location of an object. These results have
generated the puzzle of belief-ascription: Why do 3-year-old children fail the classical
false belief tasks whereas much younger children show the correct expectation in the
spontaneous response tasks? In this paper I shall argue that (i) infants and young
children, when confronted with the two forms of false belief tasks do not face the
same problem and (ii) behind the two testing situations there are different ways to
understand theory of mind. I shall propose that what appears in infants is the natural
human disposition to intersubjectivity.
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Introduction
The concept of Theory of Mind (ToM) has considerably changed since its first proposal in the
paper Premack andWoodruff ’s (1978). Focusing the interest on humans and in particular on human
acquisition has posed methodological problems, which are still at issue.
The aim of first human studies was to understand how young children acquire the representation
of others’ mental states, in particular beliefs, and how they distinguish them from their own and from
reality. To test the acquisition of this main conceptual change Wimmer and Perner (1983) designed
the False Belief Task. According to children’s performance on this test the acquisition of ToM has
been shown to emerge at around 4 years of age.
In recent years a new trend emerged: researchers have found ways to verify the capacity of passing
the false belief test in much younger children. Clements and Perner (1994) first showed that it is
possible to assess implicit comprehension of false beliefs in 3-years-olds monitoring the direction
of their gaze. Other researchers, using the violation of expectation paradigm have proven that
also 15-month-old-children may attribute to an agent a false belief about the location of an object
(Baillargeon et al., 2010).
These new results have generated what Perner and Roessler (2012) call a puzzle about belief. Why
do 3-year-old children fail the classical false belief tasks whereas much younger children show the
correct expectation in the spontaneous response tasks?
The question I intend to discuss here concerns the very existence of a puzzle. Are implicit and
explicit false belief tasks comparable? Todiscuss this point let us analyze first the relationship between
the false belief task and ToM.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 11841
Airenti The puzzle of belief ascription
The Development of ToM and the False
Belief Task
The importance attributed to the false belief task with respect
to the development of ToM has been criticized in the past. For
instance, Bloom and German (2000) argued that passing the false
belief task requires other abilities besides ToM and conversely
that ToM cannot be reduced to the ability to pass the false belief
task. In a similar vein Apperly (2012) argues that there is more
to ToM than having a conceptual grasping of mental states. In
his view ToM is also a set of cognitive processes and a social
competence attesting to individual variability; then no single
task can be considered as the right “measure of ToM” across
development.
In contrast, there are authors who still consider that the false
belief task is a good indicator of explicit belief understanding.
The hypothesis is that false belief comprehension is a step
in a ToM scale including what children may know about
persons and minds (Wellman and Liu, 2004). Cultural variation
would result in differences in the sequence (Shahaeian et al.,
2011). Variations in the sequence and acquisition times would
interestingly characterize atypical populations like children with
deafness, autism and Asperger syndrome (Peterson et al.,
2012).
At the core of the present debate one point is central. What are
wemeasuringwith the different forms of false belief task that are in
use? As we have seen the fundamental distinction regards implicit
vs. explicit understanding. Anticipatory looking in young children
allows inferring infants’ comprehension from their spontaneous
behavior, while in the classical verbal tests children are asked
to give an explicit answer about the false belief (for a review of
the literature, see Low and Perner, 2012). It has been suggested
that the implicit capacity shown by young children could have its
basis in the human attitude to automatically encode others’ beliefs
that would be active throughout development. This attitude has
been shown both in 7-month-old infants and adults by Kovács
et al. (2010) who argued that it could be part of a human-specific
“social sense.” This work nicely fits in with the standpoint that the
implicit and explicit false belief tests tap two different cognitive
mechanisms and that perspective tracking is a process that it is
often disrupted in various ways in the verbal versions of the task
(Rubio-Fernández and Geurts, 2013). Interestingly, it has been
shown that also in adults perspective tracking is a continuous
process that can be disrupted by false belief questions (Rubio-
Fernández, 2013). Thus, there is evidence in favor of the position
that early understanding of belief is implicit while the classical
false belief task requires explicit reasoning about actors’ reasons
for how to act. It is the latter task that is not acquired before 4 years
of age (Perner and Roessler, 2012).
The existence of two distinct systemswas postulated byApperly
and Butterfill (2009). One system, efficient but limited and
inflexible, would explain the ability shown by infants to deal with
ToM tasks as well as social abilities of some non-human animals.
The system constituted of mental concepts (desires and beliefs),
would gradually develop in children allowing reasoning about
others’ minds in a flexible but less efficient way. Adults would be
equipped with both systems. This point of view is supported by
evidence showing a task specific developmental continuity in false
belief reasoning (Thoermer et al., 2012). An important role in the
transcription of the first system into reasoning would be played by
the emergence of language and executive functions.
Meta-analysis has shown no significant difference for
false belief tasks types in their relation to language (Milligan
et al., 2007). However, Helming et al. (2014) maintain that
the analysis of the pragmatic framework of the test may
elucidate the puzzle of belief ascription. Their thesis is that
children’s second person engagement with the experimenter’s
communicative action disrupts their ability to keep track of the
content of the instrumental agent’s false belief. The cooperative
perspective would prevail in the verbal task explaining children’s
failure. Children would transform the experimenter test
question into the question “Where should Sally look for her
toy?”
Through the analysis of the literature it emerges that while
at the beginning we had a definition of ToM and the false
belief task was intended to ascertain its development now we
are questioning the very definition of ToM. Thus the concept of
implicit belief becomes central. What is an implicit belief and
what is its relationship with ToM? How to avoid the risk of
begging the question: ToM is what is measured by ToM tests?
There is no demonstration that non-verbal and verbal false belief
tests measure the same capacities, and that what we call implicit
belief is comparable with explicit belief (San Juan and Astington,
2012).
Intersubjectivity and ToM
My argument is that showing that infants have implicit grasp on
others’ minds amounts to re-discovering intersubjectivity. Almost
40 years of studies on the development of intersubjectivity have
shown that infants deal and communicate with other humans
since birth (Trevarthen, 1998). It would be impossible to explain
infants’ ability to deal with others if they had no grasp at all
of what happens in their minds. Yet, this has little to do with
what traditionally has been defined as ToM. My claim is that
conflating intersubjectivity and ToM suggests a non-existing
puzzle. The problem is the centrality attributed to the false belief
task on the one hand and on the other hand the purported
equivalence posed between the two forms of it, verbal and non-
verbal. What Kovács et al. (2010) call a human-specific “social
sense” has been shown for years in developmental research under
the name of intersubjectivity. The development of the explicit
capacity of reasoning about others’ mental states, i.e., ToM, is
a “specialization” of human “social sense” that since the pre-
school years humans may use to deal with particularly difficult
situations.
One fundamental point of interest for developmental studies
is the gap between how brilliant young children appear in some
interactive situations and how ignorant of fundamental facts
regarding other minds they turn out to be when tested in
experimental situations.
Let us consider two cases of controversial interpretation
of young children’s behavior, namely humor and deceit. The
literature on intersubjectivity has shown that children before
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 11842
Airenti The puzzle of belief ascription
2 years of age are able to participate in humorous interactions with
adults and to engage in some forms of intentional falsifications of
reality (Reddy, 2008). On the contrary in experimental situations
these two forms of behavior are not shown to occur before
4/5 years of age. How may we explain this discrepancy? A
possible answer is that in studies on intersubjectivity children
are observed in the course of interactions and they show their
intentionality and proficiency in engaging with others. Instead, in
experimental situations children are requested either to explicitly
manipulate others’ mental states or to have a judgment on the
situation, i.e., to show what traditionally are considered as ToM
abilities.
I take the case of humor. Young children in interactions
with adults share situations of amusement. This means that
there is a form of understanding that some acts are not
serious: putting a breadbasket on one’s head is not the same
as putting a spoon in one’s mouth. The first gesture makes
others laugh while the second does not. Does this mean that
young children “really know” what non-serious communication
is? In order to investigate this we carry out experiments. For
instance, a number of experiments have been made on irony
comprehension. What do these experiments test? In general
they test if children are able to comprehend that something
has been said in a non-serious way, i.e., the real meaning
of an ironic utterance but also if they understand the kind
of act that has been produced, i.e., what being ironic means.
Young children do not succeed in these tasks before 5/6 years
of age. Thus the children that we observe in interaction
are able to distinguish serious from non-serious situations in
a rather appropriate way from a very young age, while in
experiments children show that they do not know what being
non-serious means till school age. Actually these experimental
tasks are ToM tasks in the traditional definition and thus
children have the traditional ToM results. In a study we
designed an experimental task in which children had only to
prove their comprehension of the communicative intention of
ironic utterances, i.e., their non-literal meaning (Angeleri and
Airenti, 2014). For instance, if a character said to another
character who had just broken a plate: “Your mommy will
be happy!” children were expected to understand that the
intended meaning was that the mother would be upset. The
goal was to have a comprehension task not burdened with ToM
difficulties. In this condition we were able to show that even
children as young as 3 years of age might understand the non-
seriousness of an ironic utterance. In a sense we produced a
kind of intermediate situation between using a communicative
device in everyday communication and being able to explain
what happens in another person’s mind in an experimental
situation.
Thus, I argue that there is no puzzle. The so called explicit
ToM is one of the aspects that intersubjective abilities may take
in children not before 4 years of age and that evolves until
adulthood. Younger children not only—as it is obvious—do deal
with others but they do so in an effective manner without
ToM.
We should come back to the fact that the false belief task
has been devised in order to ascertain the development of the
capacity of explicitly representing others’ beliefs. Designing false
beliefs tasks that children may pass relying on those capacities
that they normally use in their everyday behavior reverses the
problem. But what does it prove with respect to ToM? 15-month-
old children may pass the non-verbal false belief task but they
are nevertheless unable to carry out or understand a deceit, to
a find a good way to overcome a communicative failure, etc.,
i.e., to plan communicative acts that require representations of
others’ beliefs. In sum, the problem of the development of ToM
remains unaltered with the connected question regarding the role
of language acquisition.
Humans are equipped from birth for interaction with others.
This implies monitoring and adapting to others’ actions and
participating in communicative exchanges. This is the clever
part of young children’s behavior. However, some situations
demand a more strategic thinking, i.e., reacting only after
having reflected upon others’ mental states. For some basic
interactive behaviors we can imagine two possible versions, one
not implying ToM and one implying ToM. This applies for
instance to failure. An infant happily communicates with her
mother but if the mother just stops the interaction as it has
been experimentally provoked in the still face situation or—with
older children—interrupting a playing sequence, the child’s
only possibility is protesting, manifesting discontent, diverting
attention (Weinberg et al., 2008). Such a situation of unexpected
behavior of the interlocutor can be handled by using ToM: Why
does mom not smile at me anymore? or Why does mom not
want to play with me anymore? The same applies to deceit.
Young children may lie but many studies have shown that they
do not plan real deceits and do not consider that others may
be liars. Deceiving and discover possible liars demands ToM,
i.e., reflecting on others’ beliefs (Airenti and Angeleri, 2011; Lee,
2013).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the study of ToM was intended to understand
how the capacity to represent mental states develops in children.
The false belief task was designed to determine when and how
this competence appears. Recently, the test itself has become the
focus of the investigation. In this way we overlook the fact that
the aim of ToM studies was to discover how children become
able to perform acts as complicated as deceiving, discovering
that others may be liars, or that in some situations lying is
considered preferable than expressing real feelings. Actually, we
have discovered something that we already knew, i.e., that even
very young children have reasonable expectations with respect
to others’ actions. This finding is consistent with the fact that
in natural situations young children are able to deal with others
rather successfully but does not improve our knowledge of
ToM. I consider that using ToM terminology in this context is
misleading. ToM is a particularly refined form of intersubjectivity
and it is not intersubjectivity that has to be seen as a form
of minimal ToM (Butterfill and Apperly, 2013). The question
remains of explaining the mix of cleverness and candor so typical
of young children, i.e., how ToM abilities transform early “social
sense.”
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